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NOTE
THE EXPLOITATION OF TRUST:
THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE IN ALASKA AS
APPLIED TO PRISON GROUP
THERAPY
This Note examines the application of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege under Rule 504 of the Alaska Rules of Evi-
dence. The Note argues that the psychotherapist-patient
privilege should be extended in Alaska to include commu-
nications made during prison group therapy.  It begins with
a general discussion of privileges and the psychotherapist-
patient privilege in Alaska. It then argues, with reference to
a leading Alaska Court of Appeals case, Beaver v. State,
that the psychotherapist-patient privilege should apply to
prison group therapy as a means of facilitating trust and re-
habilitation in prison group therapy.
The veneer of social trust is often thin.  As lies spread—by
imitation, or in retaliation, or to forestall suspected decep-
tion—trust is damaged.  Yet trust is a social good to be
protected just as much as the air we breathe or the water
we drink.  When it is damaged, the community as a whole
suffers; and when it is destroyed, societies falter and col-
lapse.
—Sissela Bok1
Copyright © 2001 by Christina L. Lewis.  This Note is also available on the Inter-
net at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/18ALRLewis.
The author would like to thank Professor Andrew Taslitz of Howard University
for his help on this Note. The author notes that any errors in the work are the
author’s own and do not reflect on contributors to this effort.
1. Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by
the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 790 (1997) (quoting SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL
CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 28 (1978)).
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I.  INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the Alaska Court of Appeals decided Beaver v. State,2
holding that communications made by an adjudicated juvenile sex
offender, Patrick Beaver, were admissible as evidence even though
the statements were made during group therapy at a juvenile cor-
rectional facility.3  When sentencing Beaver, the court relied on
statements he made during his participation in rehabilitative group
therapy sessions.4  These statements divulged past experiences and
personal propensity to commit sexual abuse.5  The court concluded
that the statements could be admitted at a subsequent hearing
without violating Beaver’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination since he failed to affirmatively assert his right, even
after he received a warning that his statements could be used
against him.6  The court reasoned that participation in a prison re-
habilitation group is voluntary, and therefore any statements made
during the session constitute voluntary confessions.7
Since neither side referenced or argued the psychotherapist-
patient privilege, the court did not consider the protections af-
forded by the privilege.  This Note asserts that an additional argu-
ment should have been made that Patrick Beaver’s statements
were protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege as set forth
in Rule 504 of the Alaska Rules of Evidence. Additionally, this
Note contends that the argument should have been raised and in-
deed, been successful.  In light of Rule 504, allowing the statements
into evidence was a conspicuous violation of Patrick Beaver’s evi-
dentiary rights.
There is no existing judicial opinion or legal precedent in
Alaska interpreting Rule 504 in the context of group therapy.  The
only guidance provided is a commentary to the Rule, stating that
“[p]articipants in group therapy programs in the presence of a psy-
chotherapist may be covered under the definition of ‘confidential
communication.’”8  The sentence is followed by a citation to an ar-
ticle by Wayne Cross entitled “Privileged Communications Be-
tween Participants in Group Psychotherapy.”9 This Note asserts
that the reference in the Rule to the Cross article supports an ar-
2. 933 P.2d 1178 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
3. Id. at 1186.
4. Id. at 1180.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1181-82.
7. Id. at 1183.
8. ALASKA R. EVID. 504 cmt. (2000).
9. Wayne Cross, Privileged Communications Between Participants in Group
Psychotherapy, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER  (1970).
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gument for the expansion in Alaska of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege to cover group therapy.
The fact pattern of the Beaver case supports the contention
that Alaska should apply the psychotherapist-patient privilege to
prison group therapy sessions.  This Note begins by discussing
privileges generally and then explores the dynamics of the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege specifically.  The Note then examines
the meaning and purpose of Rule 504 of the Alaska Rules of Evi-
dence and concludes that prison group therapy sessions should be
included within the scope of the Rule.
II.  THE ESSENCE OF PRIVILEGES GENERALLY AND THE NATURE
OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
A. Privileges Generally
Generally, a privilege permits the non-disclosure of certain in-
formation by a witness in civil or criminal litigation.10  A privilege
may be invoked outside the courtroom, in matters such as pretrial
discovery requests and attempts to compel testimony, as well as
during the trial itself.11
Privileges are created to preserve values and relationships, the
benefits of which are believed to outweigh the need for the evi-
dence at trial.12  Privileges are based on the belief that some rela-
tionships are necessarily founded on confidentiality and the suppo-
sition that the individual should sometimes be protected from
intrusions by the government and the courts.13  Although privileges
inevitably result in the suppression of otherwise probative evi-
dence, the desideratum of a “perfect trial” is outweighed by the
relationships and societal values that privileges preserve.14
In deciding whether a privilege exists, scholars often refer to
the four-part test developed by Dean John Wigmore of Northwest-
ern University School of Law.15  In order to warrant inclusion in a
10. STEVEN I. FRIEDLAND ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE 646 (2000).
11. Id. at 647.
12. Id.
13. S. Kay McNab, Note, Criticizing the Self-Criticism Privilege, 1987 U. ILL.
L. REV. 675, 676-77 (1987).
14. GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 9.1, at
381 (2d ed. 1987).
15. RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 10 (1966).  “The first edition of Wigmore’s work on
evidence appeared in 1904, the second in 1923, and the third in 1940.”  Id at 39.
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class of privileged communications, the communication must meet
these four criteria:
(1) Does the communication in the usual circumstances of the
given professional relation originate in a confidence that it will
not be disclosed?  (2) Is the inviolability of that confidence es-
sential to the achievement of the purpose of the relationship?
(3) Is the relation one that should be fostered?  (4) Is the ex-
pected injury to the relation, through fear of later disclosure,
greater than the expected benefit to justice in obtaining the tes-
timony?16
Both federal and state legislatures consider these four factors
in deciding whether a privilege exists.  The type of evidence pro-
tected by privileges, however, may vary among different states, and
between federal and state courts.17  These differences arise in part
from the various methods of creating a privilege—through the
adoption of common law, by legislative acts, and in the recognition
of constitutional rights.18  The Federal Rules of Evidence do little
to promote uniformity.  Although Congress enumerated a list of
privileges included in the “Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,”19
Rule 501 ultimately replaced these rules, providing that all privi-
leges are governed “by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience.”20
Many states have adopted privileges similar to those specified
in the Proposed Rules, but almost all have adjusted the wording or
added and subtracted from the provisions.21  The legislatures of
most states have codified the privileges developed in common law
in various forms.22
16. Id. at 10.
17. FRIEDLAND ET AL., supra note 10, at 647.
18. Id. at 648. Constitutional privileges include the privilege against self-
incrimination as set forth in the Fifth Amendment and the implied privilege of ex-
ecutive immunity.  Id.; see also  U.S. CONST. amend V.
19. FRIEDLAND ET AL., supra note 10, at 641-45. The Proposed Rules of Evi-
dence include the following: Rule 503, lawyer-client privilege; Rule 504, psycho-
therapist-patient privilege; Rule 505, husband-wife privilege; Rule 506, communi-
cations to clergymen (not enacted); Rule 507, privilege to refuse to disclose
political vote (not enacted); Rule 508, trade secrets (not enacted), Rule 509, se-
crets of state and other official information (not enacted); Rule 510, identity of
informer (not enacted).  Id.
20. LILLY, supra note 14, at 384.
21. Id. at 385.  Although the state laws are not necessarily uniform, Lilly indi-
cates that the laws are generally consistent.  Id.
22. FRIEDLAND ET AL., supra note 10, at 648.
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Neither federal nor state privileges are automatic or fixed.  By
contrast, privileges can be waived both impliedly and expressly.
Implied waivers may occur when protected information is commu-
nicated to a third party; express waivers may occur when individu-
als overtly decline to invoke the privilege, such as through a signed
writing.23  Express waivers must be made “voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently.”24  The waiver must occur in the absence of any
threat, coercion or duress.25
B. The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
The psychotherapist-patient privilege was first recognized in
federal courts after the pioneering decision by the United States
Supreme Court in Jaffee v. Redmond.26  In Jaffee, the court sup-
pressed statements made by a police officer to her social worker in
a civil action that occurred after the officer shot and killed a man.27
The court held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege falls un-
der Rule 501 because such a privilege serves a “public good tran-
scending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all ra-
tional means for ascertaining truth.”28  The case extended the
privilege from communications to licensed psychiatrists and psy-
chologists to confidential communications made to licensed social
workers in the course of psychotherapy, and the court reasoned
that all of these have significant roles in mental health treatment.29
The court highlighted the utilitarian benefit of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege, stating that it “serves the public interest by facili-
tating the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suf-
fering the effects of a mental or emotional problem.  The mental
health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public
good of transcendent importance.”30
Two justifications for the psychotherapist-patient privilege
exist today.31  The first is the fundamental recognition of a patient’s
23. Id. at 649.
24. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 572 (1987) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)).
25. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 801-02 (1970).
26. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id. at 15 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)).
29. Id. at 15-16.
30. Id. at 11.
31. PAUL M. SMITH, The Physician-Patient, Psychotherapist-Patient and Re-
lated Privileges, in TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES 377, 382 (Scott N. Stone & Ronald S.
Liebman eds., 1983).
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interest in the privacy of therapeutic matters.32  The second is based
on the belief that confidentiality is essential to the practice and ef-
ficacy of psychotherapy.33  In 1960, the Group for the Advancement
of Psychiatry stated that “[a]mong physicians, the psychiatrist has a
special need to maintain confidentiality.  His capacity to help his
patients is completely dependent upon their willingness and ability
to talk freely.”34  Psychologists as early as Freud recognized that
“[t]he whole undertaking becomes lost [labor] if a single concession
is made to secrecy.”35 Communications are likely to be repressed if
patients are concerned that their words may be used against them
in a future lawsuit.36
The psychotherapist-patient privilege has been codified in
some form by all 50 states and the District of Columbia.37  The gen-
eral public believes that communications to a therapist are confi-
dential, that confidentiality is essential to the achievement of the
purpose of the relationship, and that its benefits outweigh the in-
jury to justice.38  It has been suggested that the confidentiality pro-
vided by the psychotherapist-patient privilege may be even more
important than that ensured by the doctor-patient privilege since
disclosure of private thoughts can be even more painful to the indi-
vidual than disclosure of certain physical ailments.39  The psycho-
therapist-patient privilege has been recognized as a class of pro-
tected communication under the Wigmore test because of the
importance of complete communication in psychotherapy, the
natural resistance of individuals to fully disclose information, and
the individual’s magnified reluctance to make full disclosures when
there is a threat of future criminal prosecution.40
C. The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege and Group Therapy
Group therapy is an increasingly common method of treating
patients.41  As in individual treatment, members of the group di-
32. Id.
33. Ralph Slovenko, Foreword to DANIEL W. SHUMAN & MYRON F. WEINER,
THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION vii
(1987).
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting Freud).
36. SLOVENKO, supra note 15, at 41.
37. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12 (1996).
38. SLOVENKO, supra note 15, at 40-50 (arguing that the psychotherapist-
patient privilege passes the four-part Wigmore test).
39. SMITH, supra note 31, at 386.
40. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10; see also SMITH, supra note 31, at 386.
41. See SLOVENKO, supra note 15, at 119.
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vulge past experiences, emotions, and thoughts to both the trained
therapist and the other members of the group.42  Dr. Jacob L. Mo-
reno introduced group therapy as a method of treating patients in
the United States during the 1930s.43  Today, group therapy is often
the preferred mode of treatment by individuals who feel that the
interaction among group members has a therapeutic effect unavail-
able in individual psychotherapy.44
There are two theoretical approaches to group therapy.  The
first concerns itself with the separate individuals of the group, em-
ploying the group as a medium by which the therapist can deal with
each individual patient more effectively.45  Individual patients feel
freer to express their thoughts because they are in a setting similar
to the real world, but without societal constraints, and are free to
discuss their thoughts and emotions with impunity.46  The second
approach views the group as one individual, a functioning social
unit which works together to solve the group’s problems.47  Both
approaches require each member of the group to become a thera-
peutic agent of the others.48
Although all 50 states have recognized the psychotherapist-
patient privilege for individual therapy, not all explicitly extend the
privilege to group therapy.49  Some states have assumed an expan-
sive privilege, covering both individual and group therapy, while
other state statutes are silent on the issue of group therapy.50
42. Jessica G. Weiner, “And the Wisdom to Know the Difference”: Confidenti-
ality vs. Privilege in the Self-Help Setting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 249-50 (1995).
43. Cross, supra note 9, at 191 n.3.
44. SAMUEL KNAPP & LEON VANDECREEK, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS IN
THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS 75 (1987).
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. Cross, supra note 9, at 196.
48. See id.
49. See KNAPP, supra note 44, at 75.
50. Id. Although a comprehensive list of states that protect communications
under the psychotherapist-patient privilege offered in group therapy has never
been compiled, the research for this Note revealed that group therapy is protected
by the privilege in California, Colorado, Kansas, Minnesota, and New Jersey.  For
the specific provisions, see part VI of this Note.
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III.  ALASKA LAW AND THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE
A. The General Privilege
Alaska codified the psychotherapist-patient privilege in Rule
504 of the Alaska Rules of Evidence.51  The privilege is fairly ex-
pansive, including statements to a person who the patient had rea-
sonable grounds to believe was a physician, psychotherapist, or
psychologist.52  The first case to address the privilege was Allred v.
State,53 in which the Alaska Supreme Court refused to consider
statements made by a defendant to a psychotherapist in a first-
degree murder case.54  The court evaluated Professor Wigmore’s
four factors to determine whether a privilege existed, and held that
the psychotherapeutic relationship satisfied each of the factors.55
The Court noted that a patient’s statements to a therapist are “in-
herently confidential” and that “confidence is essential to achieve-
ment of the psychotherapeutic goal.”56  The court did not extend
the privilege to therapists who are not licensed psychologists or
psychiatrists, and extended it only to those treatments that “require
confidentiality for [their] success.”57
The psychotherapist-patient privilege was examined again by
the Alaska Court of Appeals in State v. Wetherhorn.58  The court
held that Alaska Statutes section 47.67.060 abrogated the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege to communications with psychologists in
child abuse civil trials.59  However, the court noted that the statute
did not apply to criminal proceedings.60  The court emphasized the
sensitivity of criminal cases and held that the privilege should apply
more narrowly in criminal proceedings than in civil cases.61
B. Group Therapy
Despite the distinctions made between licensed practitioners
and counselors, and between civil and criminal proceedings, the
51. ALASKA R. EVID. 504 (2000).
52. Id. at 504(a)(3).
53. 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976).
54. Id. at 422.
55. Id. at 417.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 420.
58. 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
59. Id. at 277.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 281.
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scope of the privilege with regard to group therapy in Alaska is still
brimming with ambiguity.  The commentary to Rule 504 states that
“participants in group therapy programs in the presence of a psy-
chotherapist may be covered under the definition of ‘confidential
communication.’”62  There is no other reference to group therapy in
the rule and the only clarification offered is a citation to a 1970 ar-
ticle by Wayne Cross in a journal entitled Law and the Social Or-
der.63  Since the commentary to Rule 504 offers no other supportive
citations, it suggests that the Cross article is the appropriate
authority to consult in determining when group therapy should be
included under the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
In his article, Cross explores the dynamics of group therapy,
stating that “[the] reliance on third parties, which is the central fea-
ture of group therapy, acquires obvious significance when one at-
tempts an evaluation of the propriety of granting a privilege to
group communications.”64  Dr. Jacob L. Moreno, the pioneer of
group therapy in the United States, is mentioned several times in
the article.65  Dr. Moreno believed that uninhibited expression was
essential to the success of group therapy.66  Cross elaborates on Dr.
Moreno’s position writing that “[n]o group participant would make
himself vulnerable . . . by placing his most secret thoughts before
the group, unless he could be assured of confidentiality.”67  Cross
notes that many patients are likely to discontinue therapy and
many others will be unwilling to make necessary contributions to
the group if trust is not established.68
Cross emphasizes the need for trust in group therapy where
individuals feel particularly vulnerable.  A group therapist must set
a goal of helping the participants overcome anxieties because it is
necessary to collapse the natural resistance of those who feel vul-
nerable.69  According to Cross, the task would be insurmountable if
the group members were aware that all communications could be
disclosed at a later time.70
Lastly, Cross advocates expanding the psychotherapist-patient
privilege to group therapy.  He states that society, in accord with
public policy, should encourage the treatment of the mentally ill
62. ALASKA R. EVID. 504(a)(4) cmt. (2000) (emphasis added).
63. Cross, supra note 9.
64. Cross, supra note 9, at 197.
65. Id. at 198.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 198-99.
70. Id. at 199.
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and the emotionally troubled.71  Society should support group ther-
apy because the process focuses on helping individuals enhance
their relationships with their outside environment, thus improving
society as a whole.72  Cross argues that society should be even more
interested in protecting group therapy than individual therapy be-
cause group therapy explores the individual’s social relationships,
and can better treat problems in advance of any future harm to
those relationships.73  This rationale may be of particular relevance
with regard to individuals seeking treatment within a correctional
setting because incarceration implies noncompliance with social
norms.  Because group therapy is necessary for the treatment of
individuals for both intrinsic and pragmatic reasons, Cross argues
that society should foster the maintenance and development of
group relationships.74
Since the commentary to Alaska Rule 504 does not reference
any other authority besides the Cross article, the drafters of Rule
504 must have intended for the Cross article to be the governing
authority in determining whether group therapy should be included
within Alaska’s psychotherapist-patient privilege.  As stated above,
the Cross article ardently advocates for the extension of the privi-
lege to group therapy, especially when there is a particularly vul-
nerable population whose progress depends on confidentiality.
IV.  GROUP THERAPY IN THE PRISON SYSTEM
A. The Alaska Goal of Rehabilitation
The fact pattern of the Beaver case serves as an interesting ba-
sis on which to examine the benefits of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege for individuals participating in group therapy in prison in
Alaska.  Beaver made his statements during group therapy in a ju-
venile correctional facility.  This is precisely the type of setting for
which Cross asserts the importance of confidentiality.
Nowhere is the psychotherapist-patient privilege more essen-
tial than in the context of prison group therapy.  The prison popu-
lation is filled with individuals wary of admitting to past experi-
ences.75  The individuals are particularly vulnerable to the
71. Id.
72. Id. at 200.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See SLOVENKO, supra note 15, at 128.  Slovenko states:
[P]risoners are usually distrusting souls.  They feel there is no
privacy or confidence, and so they do not even want to talk to a
therapist, individually or in a group.  The therapeutic situation
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consequences of revealing personal information, an issue of singu-
lar importance because they are arguably the population most in
need of the rehabilitation that therapy may help provide.  Since
prisoners are generally more distrustful than the average individ-
ual, it is essential that the therapist demonstrate that she or he is
trustworthy.76  Some prison authorities have observed the reluc-
tance of prisoners to trust other individuals, and feel that betraying
such hard-earned trust would undermine the efficacy of group
therapy altogether.77  When asked his opinion on the subject, one
prison administrator asserted, “It is my personal conviction that it
is not the role of the psychiatrist to uncover . . . information under
the guise of therapy, if he expects to expose it to the warden.  I
cannot help feeling that disclosure under these circumstances is
sort of a ‘psychological entrapment.’”78
The efficacy of group therapy should be of particular value in
Alaska because both the Alaska legislature and the Alaska judici-
ary have emphasized the importance of rehabilitation among the
convicted.  In Hansen v. State,79 the Alaska Supreme Court stated
that “[t]he twin goals of penal administration in Alaska, reforma-
tion of the offender and the need to protect the public would be
best served by a sentence that accommodates treatment as well as
protects society and reaffirms societal norms.”80  Article I, section
12 of the Alaska Constitution also states that “multiple goals en-
compassed within these broad constitutional standards include re-
habilitation of the offender into a noncriminal member of soci-
ety.”81
hopefully will demonstrate to the prisoner that not all persons
are to be mistrusted.  Confidentiality is of utmost importance
when treating individuals who are basically distrustful of others.
Id.
76. See id. at 128.
77. Id. at 129.  Norman Fenton, a counselor with extensive experience in
leading group therapy sessions in prison states:
It is obvious that if a group leader reported unfavorably on an
inmate, the feelings that would arise among others in the group,
even though they agreed with the appraisal, might undermine
the group counseling program.  The spontaneity of the proce-
dure would be lost after a report of any kind from the group
leader.
Id.
78. Id.
79. 582 P.2d 1041 (Alaska 1978).
80. Id. at 1047 (quoting Mattern v. State, 500 P.2d 228, 235 (Alaska 1972)).
81. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 12.
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Article I, section 12 of the Alaska Constitution serves as the
basis for the predominant Alaska case law.  The Alaska Constitu-
tion consistently emphasizes the dual goals of protection of the
public and rehabilitation of the criminal.82  The Alaska Constitution
has been interpreted as granting incarcerated inmates the right to
access rehabilitative programs.83  The legislature acted accordingly,
passing Alaska Statutes section 33.30.020, requiring “programs for
the treatment, care, rehabilitation and reformation of prisoners.”84
The Alaska Supreme Court limited this right significantly in Rust v.
State, holding that the right to psychiatric care depends upon the
determination of a physician or other health care provider that a
prisoner exhibits a serious disease or injury, and that the disease is
curable.85  Despite this limitation, the argument for the protection
of prison therapy groups is strengthened by the analysis of the
Alaska Supreme Court in Rust.  After Rust, prisoners who are
granted access to psychiatric care are likely to be those who are
considered treatable.  Since most inmates who are allowed access
to psychological and psychiatric care are treatable, an effective
means of providing care is in the best interest of both the prisoner
and society.  Although Alaska Statutes section 33.30.020 has been
repealed, it is important to evaluate the limitations imposed by
Rust in the event that Article I, section 12 of the Alaska Constitu-
tion is interpreted as having similar confines.
B. Ethical and Economic Benefits of Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation is a means of reducing crime induced by the pa-
thologies of individual offenders.86  The normative argument for
rehabilitation generally focuses on the rights of prisoners.  The
Alaska Constitution actualizes this normative view in Article I, sec-
tion 12: “Criminal administration shall be based upon the follow-
ing: the need for protecting the public, community condemnation
of the offender, the rights of victims of crimes, restitution from the
82. Nelson v. State, 619 P.2d 480, 481 (Alaska Ct. App. 1980).
83. Smith v. State, 790 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Alaska 1990).
84. Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134, 143 (Alaska 1978) (quoting ALASKA STAT. §
33.30.020 (repealed 1986)). Although Alaska Statutes section 33.30.020 has since
been repealed, Alaska courts still interpret the Alaska Constitution as providing a
fundamental right to rehabilitation.  See Brandon v. State, Dep’t of Corrs., 938
P.2d 1029, 1032 (Alaska 1997) (stating “[t]he Department of Corrections correctly
concedes that there is a fundamental right to rehabilitation” in Alaska Constitu-
tion, Article I, section 12).
85. Rust, 582 P.2d at 143.
86. RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 27 (1997).
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offender, and the principle of reformation.”87  The Alaska Constitu-
tion does not place prisoners’ rights above retributive punishment,
but classifies the two values as equal in importance.88
Critics of the retributive model censure analyses of the
costs/benefits of incarceration versus rehabilitation.89  Perhaps in an
ideal society, the costs of rehabilitating prisoners would be a con-
cern secondary to the normative goal of helping inmates become
better members of society.  However, since fiscal concerns are of-
ten in the forefront of policy decisions, advocates of rehabilitation
are beginning to replace normative arguments with economic ones.
The current cost of maintaining prisoners is compounded by a
high recidivism rate.90  Since 1998, almost 1,600 prisoners are re-
leased each day from state and federal prisons.91  The state of
Alaska is not immune.  The Alaska prison system has an 87% re-
cidivism rate.92  In other words, almost nine out of ten persons who
are placed in the custody of the Alaska Department of Corrections
will return to prison once released from custody.93  Seemingly, in-
carceration is not a sufficient deterrent for a majority of former
inmates.  The high percentage of rearrests combined with the con-
87. ALASKA CONST. art. I, §12.
88. See id.; see also State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970).
Within the ambit of this constitutional phraseology are found
the objectives of rehabilitation of the offender into a noncrimi-
nal member of society, isolation of the offender from society to
prevent criminal conduct during the period of confinement, de-
terrence of the offender himself after his release from confine-
ment or other penological treatment, as well as deterrence of
other members of the community who might possess tendencies
toward criminal conduct similar to that of the offender, and
community condemnation of the individual offender, or in
other words, reaffirmation of societal norms for the purpose of
maintaining respect for the norms themselves.
Chaney, 477 P.2d at 444.
89. See ANN CHIIH LIN, REFORM IN THE MAKING: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
SOCIAL POLICY IN PRISON 19 (2000); see also Michael K. Greene, Show Me the
Money!  Should Taxpayer Funds Be Used to Educate Prisoners Under the Guise of
Reducing Recidivism?, 24 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 173 (1998)
(arguing that taxpayer money should not be spent on the rehabilitation of prison-
ers).
90. See LIN, supra note 89, at 3.
91. The Sentencing Project, at http://www.sentencingproject.org/brief/
pub1036.pdf.
92. Anthony Lee Brown, From the Inside, at http://www.eclectica.org/v2n4/
inside.html.
93. Id.
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stant influx of new prisoners causes problems of overcrowding and
an inflated prison population.94  The rising prison population will
require either increased spending to build more prisons or the re-
lease of prisoners before their sentences have ended.95
Simply avoiding recidivism does not make a former prisoner a
productive member of society.  In addition to the cost of the re-
volving door in the current prison system, studies show that those
prisoners who manage to stay out of prison are not self-sufficient.
Between 1984 and 1987, only 63% of individuals released from
federal prison were employed after one year.96 Effective rehabilita-
tive and vocational programs are a means of combating the fiscal
burdens that arise from maintaining repeat offenders and caring for
prisoners who lack the skills and emotional faculties to find em-
ployment upon their release.
Retribution and public safety undoubtedly play meaningful
roles in prison sentencing.  This Note is not advocating a weak
stance on justice—prisoners should be confined when they have
committed an illegal act.  A policy facilitating rehabilitation does
not mean shorter sentences.  Rather, rehabilitation is a means of
making a responsible effort to return prisoners to society as pro-
ductive citizens.  If the Alaska prison system has an effective reha-
bilitation program, recidivism may be reduced, saving the state
money.  Since confidentiality is absolutely necessary for effective
rehabilitation, the psychotherapist-patient privilege should be ex-
tended to cover group therapy sessions in a prison setting for both
normative and fiscal reasons.
Neither justice nor the goal of rehabilitation is furthered by
the absence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege.  Opponents of
extending the psychotherapist-patient privilege so that group ther-
apy in prison can be truly effective may emphasize the importance
of discovering the truth, which may be lost by the exclusion of
statements made by a prisoner in group therapy. However, when
prisoners are not assured of confidentiality, they are deterred from
participating in group therapy altogether. Prisoners will not share
confidential communications with the therapist, ensuring that their
states of mind will remain hidden from the therapist and society.
The statements are just as unavailable to the justice system if pris-
oners do not participate in group therapy as they are if the prison-
ers’ statements are protected by the privilege.97
94. LIN, supra note 89, at 4.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Weiner, supra note 42, at 291-92.
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V.  THE TENOR OF TRUST
A. The Importance of Trust in Effective Rehabilitation
The psychotherapist-patient privilege is built on a principle of
trust.  The efficacy of therapy depends upon the individual’s ability
to trust the therapist.98  Similarly, the success of group therapy de-
pends upon each individual’s ability to trust the therapist and the
other members of the group.99  As a result, therapy sessions are
structured to make individuals feel secure so that they are less
likely to conceal vulnerabilities.  The therapist attempts to provide
an environment that feels confidential, encouraging each individual
to share secrets, memories, and emotions.  As a result of the inti-
mate nature of group therapy, individuals commonly assume that
their communications will not be disclosed outside of the group,
even if individuals are not assured that their statements will remain
confidential.100
Betrayal of trust, even when the trust is misplaced, does not
further the policy goal of rehabilitation.  When statements are used
against a prisoner in subsequent proceedings, there is a twofold de-
terrent to rehabilitation: first, other prisoners will not participate in
rehabilitation programs lest their statements be treated as volun-
tary confessions; second, the effectiveness of the therapy session on
those who do participate will be minimal since the individuals will
not feel free to disclose incriminating information.  Simply stated,
free communication is essential to effective group therapy, and it is
lost under threat of punitive penalty.101
B. Reciprocal Trust Between the Citizenry and the State
The trust endangered by the disclosure of confidential com-
munications reaches beyond prisoners and therapists.  There is also
a threat of diminished trust between the government and the citi-
zenry.  In an article on the Fourth Amendment, Scott Sundby de-
fines trust in the context of a constitutional value.102  He wrote that
“government action draws its legitimacy from the trust that the
98. See Cross, supra note 9, at 198 (“The therapeutic virtue of groups lies in
their potential for uninhibited expression.”).
99. Id. (“It would seem that a mutual trust is inherent in the sort of multilat-
eral soul-baring that occurs in group sessions.  No group participant would make
himself vulnerable . . . unless he could be assured of confidentiality.”).
100. Weiner, supra note 42, at 247.
101. Cross, supra note 9, at 198.
102. Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual
Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751 (1994).
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electorate places in its representatives by choosing them to gov-
ern.”103  To him, this trust between the electorate and the govern-
ment is imperiled when the government endangers the citizenry’s
ability to give its consent in an “informed and free manner.”104
Sundby argues that the role of trust is reciprocal, and that its
existence is essential for citizens to feel that they have the opportu-
nity to participate meaningfully in society.105  Those who feel that
the government does not recognize their individual beliefs and
concerns perceive the government as lacking legitimacy, resulting
in an increased feeling of alienation.106  Trust diminishes when the
government acts coercively, deceitfully or contrary to promulgated
public policy.  Citizens elect officials for the purposes of executing
constitutional and legislative decrees fairly and equitably.
In an article evaluating deceptive tactics used by law enforce-
ment officials, Christopher Slobogin concluded that
routine deceit coarsens the liar, increases the likelihood of expo-
sure, and when exposed, maximizes the loss of trust.  When the
deceptive practice is carried out by an agent of the government,
it is even more reprehensible, both because the liar wields tre-
mendous power and because government requires trust to be ef-
fective.107
Margaret Paris also advocates for rules against deceitful tactics
used in interrogations of suspects.108  Paris emphasizes the govern-
ment’s role in inculcating values, contending that citizens mimic
those values upheld by the government, making trustworthy be-
havior exceptionally important.109  She asserts that the role of trust
is even more essential in the criminal process and advocates stan-
dard legal rules that guide governmental agents.110 Furthermore,
she states that establishing legal rules minimizes the discretion of
governmental agents, ensuring that interrogatories will be executed
fairly and in accordance with public policy.111  Finally, Paris argues
103. Id. at 1777.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1778.
106. Id. at 1779.
107. Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by
the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 815 (1997).  The author explores the nature of in-
vestigative lies and deception, employing the work of moral philosopher Sissela
Bok and her framework for evaluating deception as the basis for his analysis.
108. Margaret L. Paris, Trust, Lies, and Interrogation, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L.
3, 7 (1995).
109. Id. at 31.
110. Id. at 6-7.
111. Id. at 6.
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that standard legal rules may reduce costs associated with obtaining
and monitoring the trust of the citizenry.112
Just as there should be legal rules prohibiting the use of lies
and deception during interrogations, so should legal rules exist to
facilitate trust inside the prison walls.  If society perceives the gov-
ernment as acting deceitfully, and contrary to the stated goals of
the state constitution, the general trust of the government is di-
minished.  The government should be viewed by the citizenry as an
enforcer of public policy, not as an infringer of societal values.  Re-
habilitation is an enumerated goal of the state, and the citizenry
trusts the government to carry out its purported goal truthfully,
diligently, and free of suspicion or coercion.  Evidentiary privileges
that further Alaska’s goal of rehabilitation will promote the citi-
zenry’s trust that the government will carry out constitutional poli-
cies effectively.  By contrast, if the government undermines consti-
tutional mandates, especially by divulging communications that are
perceived to be confidential, the citizenry will view the government
as an entity of impropriety, replacing trust with dissatisfaction and
suspicion.
A particularity to the Beaver case may provide fuel to critics.
In Beaver, the defendant was allegedly warned that his statements
could be used against him in future proceedings.113  There is a le-
gitimate question regarding how the use of the statements against
Beaver could inspire distrust in the government if Beaver was told
that they could be used against him.  His awareness of this possi-
bility normally would constitute a waiver of any privilege and
would be sufficient to allow his statements into evidence.  How-
ever, a waiver must not fall in the wake of duress or coercion.114
The prison staff where Beaver was incarcerated encouraged him to
rehabilitate, but only if he willingly signed a waiver acknowledging
that his statements could be used against him.115  In fact, the court
emphasized that Beaver was “not compelled to make incriminatory
disclosures (and [was] in fact warned against doing so).”116  A
warning of this sort is tantamount to giving a prisoner a choice be-
tween attempting to rehabilitate meaningfully and effectively or
not making an effort at rehabilitation at all.  An ultimatum of this
sort not only resembles coercion, it further impedes the goal of ef-
fective rehabilitation as established by the Alaska Constitution.117
112. Id. at 41-43.
113. Beaver, 933 P.2d 1179, 1180 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
114. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 794 (1970).
115. Beaver, 933 P.2d at 1180.
116. Id. at 1182.
117. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 12.
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Beaver was placed in group therapy, asked to speak about personal
events and emotions, and asked to listen to others do the same.
Despite the context in which his statements were made, his efforts
to rehabilitate were used against him in another proceeding.118
If meaningful trust between prisoners and the therapist is to be
established, the psychotherapist-patient privilege should not be so
easily waived.  First, an ultimatum that a prisoner must waive his
rights to confidentiality before participating in group therapy un-
dermines the efficacy of rehabilitation by discouraging participa-
tion and impeding open communication.  Second, since prisoners
are encouraged to share in group therapy, and the therapist oper-
ates by breaking down any resistance to open communication, us-
ing statements made in group therapy in future proceedings is co-
ercive, contrary to public policy, and improper.  The Alaska
Constitution delineates rehabilitation as a laudable goal of the
prison system, and the citizenry trusts that the government will fa-
cilitate constitutional goals.  The trust of the body politic is dam-
aged when therapy sessions are used as a forum to uncover evi-
dence of criminality rather than as a means to effectuate
rehabilitation.
An extension of the psychotherapist-patient privilege to group
therapy in prisons would facilitate trust between the prisoner and
the group, making rehabilitation more effective.119  Extending the
privilege to group therapy sessions removes the deceptive element
from the rehabilitation process.  Additionally, the privilege would
further Alaska’s constitutional goal of effectively rehabilitating
prisoners.  Furthering established public policy and removing any
chance that prisoners will be misled into sharing incriminating in-
formation in group therapy conveys to the citizenry that the gov-
ernment takes seriously the principles of respect and concern.120
VI.  STATES THAT INCLUDE GROUP THERAPY IN THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
Several states have already explicitly included group therapy
in the scope of their evidentiary rule regarding the psychotherapist-
patient privilege or have otherwise addressed this issue.  Although
a comprehensive survey to compare states that do include group
therapy and those that do not is beyond the scope of this Note,
even preliminary research reveals several states with comprehen-
118. Beaver, 933 P.2d at 1180.
119. Cross, supra note 9, at 198.
120. Id.
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sive privileges that may serve as a model for Alaska in interpreting
Rule 504.
New Jersey is exceptional in that the legislature did more than
simply expand the psychotherapist-patient privilege to include
group therapy.  Instead of interpreting the privilege broadly to en-
compass prison group therapy, the New Jersey legislature passed a
statute affirmatively protecting communications made by an in-
mate in group therapy.  The New Jersey Administrative Code title
10A, section 16-4-4, entitled “Inmate/Therapist Confidentiality,”
states: “Confidential relations between and among mental health
practitioners and individuals or groups in the course of practice are
privileged communications and not to be disclosed to any per-
son.”121  Although the provision contains a list of exceptions to con-
fidentiality, they are “applicable only in situations which present a
clear and imminent danger to the inmate or others.”122
Other states have preferred to address the issue by means of
an existing psychotherapist-patient privilege rule.  For example, the
Kansas legislature, although it has not addressed the prison popula-
tion directly, has explicitly included group therapy under the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege for patients in treatment facilities.123
The provision states that the privilege of confidentiality “extends to
individual, family or group therapy under the direction of the
treatment personnel and includes members of the patient’s fam-
ily.”124  It also states that confidential communications “shall extend
to those persons present to further the interests of the patient in
the consultation, examination or interview.”125
The Minnesota rules of evidence have also been interpreted
broadly.  In Minnesota v. Andring,126 the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that the Minnesota psychotherapist-patient privilege should
be construed to encompass statements made in group psychother-
apy.127  The court reasoned that
[t]he participants in group psychotherapy sessions are not casual
third persons who are strangers to the psychiatrist/ psycholo-
gist/nurse-patient relationship. Rather, every participant has
such a relationship with the attending professional, and, in the
121. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10A, § 16-4.4 (a) (2001). This section was examined
by the Superior Court of New Jersey in In re Inmate-Therapist Confidentiality, 540
A.2d 212 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1988).
122. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10A, § 16-4.4(b).
123. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-5602 (2000).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 342 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. 1984).
127. Id. at 133.
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group therapy setting, the participants actually become part of
the diagnostic and therapeutic process for co-participants.128
The court concluded that
[a]n interpretation which excluded group therapy from the scope
of the psychotherapist-patient privilege would seriously limit the
effectiveness of group psychotherapy as a therapeutic device.
This would be particularly unfortunate because group therapy is
a cost-effective method of psychotherapy in that it allows the
therapist to treat a number of patients at the same time.129
California has also afforded protection to statements made in
group therapy in section 1012 of the California Evidence Code.130
Although it did not originally include an explicit reference to group
therapy, section 1012 was amended in 1970 to include “other pa-
tients present at joint therapy.”131  The amendment incorporates
only those communications that are “made ‘in confidence’ and ‘by
means which . . . [disclose] the information to no third persons
other than those . . . to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary
for . . . the accomplishment of the purpose for which the psycho-
therapist is consulted.’”132
Colorado Statutes section 13-90-107 is entitled “Who may not
testify without consent” and includes group therapists.133  Section
(g) of the statute expressly states:
Nor shall any person who has participated in any psychotherapy,
conducted under the supervision of a person authorized by law
to conduct such therapy, including but not limited to group ther-
apy sessions, be examined concerning any knowledge gained
during the course of such therapy without consent of the person
to whom the testimony sought relates.134
128. Id.
129. Id. at 134.
130. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1012 (West 1995).
131. Id.
132. Id.  (quoting California Law Revision Commission, Annual Report, 9 CAL.
L. REVISION COMM’N REP. 113, app. 3, at 152 (1969)). The amendment is located
under “Law Revision Commission Comments.”  But see In re Pedro M., 96 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).  In this case, a California appellate court cre-
ated the following caveat:  if a juvenile is attending rehabilitation as a condition of
probation, the therapist can be called to testify as to the patient’s progress.  Id. at
841.  This is solely to assist the court in determining whether the patient is in com-
pliance with the terms of his probation.  Id.  However, this exception has not been
explicitly applied to individuals who participate in group therapy voluntarily.
Rather, it most likely applies only when group therapy is court-mandated as a
condition to probation.
133. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(g) (West 2000).
134. Id.
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The Alaska Constitution emphasizes rehabilitation and public
safety as dual goals,135 providing an unambiguous incentive to fol-
low precedent set by other states in including group therapy, espe-
cially prison group therapy, under the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.  Although the courts have not decided the issues directly,
the commentary to Rule 504 of the Alaska Rules of Evidence ref-
erences the article written by Cross, a clear endorsement of the ex-
pansion of the privileges to group therapy.136  The Cross article pro-
vides support for protecting statements made in the context of a
prison group therapy session, and there is no legal precedent in
Alaska to undercut its conclusions.
VII.  CONCLUSION
Group therapy is becoming an increasingly common form of
treatment.137  Some therapists predict a time when patients will be
treated primarily in a group setting.138  Almost every study on group
therapy, including the Cross article cited by the commentary to
Rule 504 of the Alaska Rules of Evidence, indicates that confiden-
tiality is essential to effective treatment.  Several states have re-
sponded by regarding group therapy as a protected form of com-
munication.  This Note asserts that Alaska should follow suit by
including communications made in group therapy, specifically
communications made in prison group therapy, as part of the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege.
The Alaska Constitution mandates that Alaska law further the
goals of public safety and rehabilitation of prisoners.  Classifying
prison group therapy as an evidentiary privilege furthers both of
these purported goals.  Interpreting Alaska law in a manner that
encourages effective rehabilitation of incarcerated persons also has
the benefits of reducing the fiscal burdens associated with a high
rate of recidivism and ensuring that the state’s constitutional goal
of rehabilitation is not undermined. Perhaps more importantly,
protecting confidential communications fosters trust between in-
mate and therapist and between the citizenry and government.
The participant in group therapy trusts that the communications
will be kept confidential, and the citizenry trusts that the govern-
ment will further public policy without engaging in practices that
can be construed as deceptive.  Including group therapy in the psy-
135. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 12.
136. See discussion, supra Part III.B.
137. See SLOVENKO, supra note 15, at 119.
138. Id.
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chotherapist-patient privilege is not simply good public policy—it is
an essential guard against the exploitation of trust.
Christina L. Lewis
